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Abstract
This study applies extant theories of property rights change to three land tenure
systems in Imperial Ethiopia. Two of the areas underwent changes in property
rights after experiencing changes in the value of land; one did not. A data set of
litigation over land rights is used in conjunction with case studies to understand
the mechanisms motivating or impeding property rights change. Amendments to
the role of the state are suggested and two conclusions are reached 1) that
movement towards greater specificity of land rights did not always occur and 2)
the changes in property rights that occurred were imposed from above, rather
than occurring endogenously. Where property rights changes did not occur, they
appear to have been blocked by the state, which was more concerned with
political survival than with revenue maximization.
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Property Rights and the Role of the State: Evidence from the Horn of Africa

The institutions that undergird the functioning of markets in the developing world have
come under scrutiny as efforts at development have been less effective than scholars have
predicted.

While modes of exchange and state/society relations are key to understanding

political and economic systems in the developing world, so too are the existing systems of
property rights. This article seeks to test and expand the economic theory of property rights with
quantitative evidence from litigation in Africa.
The article will begin with a very brief sketch of the extant theory of property rights
emphasizing its applied branch of induced institutional innovation. The mid-section of the paper
details two historic case studies: Sidama and Hamasien, both areas of Imperial Ethiopia where
property rights change occurred when the model predicts but not in the manner predicted. The
final section of the paper investigates what happened in a third area of Imperial Ethiopia that did
not correspond to the model of property rights change. We begin with some definitions.
Scholars generally define institutions as rules, traditions or conventions that govern
behavior. They can be formal, as in the case of codified laws, or they can be informal, as is often
true of traditional rules and customs. Because they govern behavior in a society, institutions play
a role as essential as factor endowments to the economic functioning of a society. Even in
societies in which formal market practices are less dominant, institutions govern informal or
traditional methods of exchange. Property rights, refer to the rights of control over an object, a
piece of land, or a resource, within the bounds of the law. I will be focusing herein on the rights
of control over land that refer to, among other things, control over the use, rental, fruits,
investment in and dispossession of the land.
The theory of property rights change has been constructed by economic historians
concerned with the institutional structure of economic systems.
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Douglass North and his

collaborators, Lance Davis and Robert Thomas, develop the idea that a change in relative price,
usually as the result of population growth, alters the incentive system within a society and leads
to a revision in the institutional structure which will allow the actors to take full advantage of the
new environment [Davis and North 1971; North and Thomas 1970]. North follows in the
footsteps of Demsetz [1967] and Coase [1937], who noted that the benefit of the new
institutional environment can come in the form of the internalisation of externalities, or in terms
of economies of scale and the lowering of risk of market failure. This early model of property
rights change, allowed for, but did not emphasize the role of political factors in directing or
influencing property rights change.

Africa
When we examine the African continent we can identify two historic paths of state
intervention in the determination of property rights.1 In some instances, the state has interceded
in a society to push property rights in the direction of communal tenure, as throughout Africa
during the colonial era when metropoles established a body of customary law that was typically
unfamiliar to their colonies [Mamdani 1996]. In other instances, such as colonial Uganda, the
state has moved to privatise rights to land where they had previously been collective, still under
the rubric (and justification) of customary law.
Some scholars have identified state intervention in the allocation of property rights as an
advantage to a society in eliminating the political bargaining that antedates any endogenous
change in property rights. The state, as the institution in a country with a monopoly on power,
can intervene and redistribute land or other property rights in a way that circumvents individuals,
interest groups and the market. Additionally, with state intervention and the imposition of
institutions from above, it is theoretically possible for a society to avoid the extensive costs of
changing a system of property rights by providing a legal framework that brings an immediate
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change instead of a gradual transition; though doing so may also generate litigation costs as the
‘losers’ in the transition seek recompense. 2
Even in the best of circumstances, significant disadvantages may accrue to attempts to
implement institutional change from above. First among them is the fact that a state can
intervene in a society only to the extent that it has control over that society and, in Africa,
sometimes this means that a state can intervene very little. Indeed, most African governments are
able to exert strict control over events in their capital cities, and even in some larger cities
outside of the capital, but they lack both the administrative structure and the resources to secure
consent at the local level in rural areas.
Opposing the reach of the state in the countryside are strong traditional institutions
governing local land rights, the allocation of authority and even the use of force. The power of
traditional institutions in Africa has been widely remarked upon [Chazan and Rothchild 1988;
Sklar 1993]. Informal and formal systems of authority are often intertwined as a direct result of
colonial policies such as ‘indirect rule’ that vested traditional chiefs with local and regional
authority that they did not previously hold. The state/society division that sustains itself in other
parts of the world should not be assumed in the African context, where the state agenda may be,
without alteration, the agenda of a particular ethnic or regional group and the society may be
fulfilling the administrative and enforcement roles we associate with the state.
The second inherent problem with the imposition of institutional change from above is
that, because the state can function apart from the market, it may not take market forces into
account and can create an inefficient economic environment. Only a very sophisticated and
vigorously enforced intervention can successfully alter an institutional system of property rights
in favour of economic efficiency.
The preceding section has identified the theoretical contributions of economic historians
and the refined version of property rights change. However, when the theory is applied by those
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concerned with praxis, it takes on a directive character, typically and most frequently that of the
evolutionary model of property rights change [Platteau 1996].3

Property Rights Theory in Practice
It is assumed by scholars of the evolutionary model of property rights, that any
modification in property rights will be in the direction of greater specification, culminating in the
strictest definition of individual rights, private property [Ault and Rutman 1979; Barrows and
Roth 1990; Johnson 1972]. Proponents of this early, economic model of property rights change,
such as Prabhu Pingali and Hans Binswanger [Pingali and Binswanger 1986], base their support
on empirical data suggesting that land rights move towards privatisation when population
increases. Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha [Feder and Noronha 1987] recognized that in
Africa as land became scarce the definition of land rights on a communal basis was no longer
satisfactory for the functioning of the economy [See also Feder et al. 1988]. Feder and Noronha
observed that in Sub-Saharan Africa many tenure systems are moving towards providing security
of tenure and the benefits of individualized holding while, in other areas, individualized land
holdings were the traditional institution of land tenure. They conclude that individualization of
land holding is necessary to capture the benefits of economically efficient farming.4 Feder and
Noronha support the position that land tenure evolves towards greater economic efficiency with
privatisation as the eventual outcome.
The evolutionary model would tell us that the specification of land rights to ensure
greater access to credit and investment comes from within the local environment. Technical
change or population growth, factors endogenous to the locality, are the impetus. This is why the
model is sometimes referred to as induced institutional innovation by development economists.
The model is linear, progressing towards privatisation and individualisation of rights with state
cooperation in titling and registration.
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Replacing the parsimonious, evolutionary theory that posited an institutional change in
response to relative price changes are two more developed models which account for the role of
societal interests in institutional change: a more sophisticated economic theory of institutional
change and a public choice model. The more sophisticated economic theory proposes that
institutional change comes about as actors seek to take advantage of opportunities for economic
gain. Like the first interpretation of the theory, institutional change in the area of property rights
develops in response to a change in relative prices caused by population growth, market
development or some other endogenous change progressing to a greater specification of property
rights. Where the new economic theory diverges from the old is in its reference to individual
actors. The more sophisticated economic theory argues that we should not expect to see a
change in property rights occur unless “actors are guaranteed a payoff at least as large as under
the status quo rules” [Weimer 1997:11]. In other words, individuals will not aid a change in the
rules of the game that they think will lead to a personal loss of income, political power or
whatever they might value.
The public choice model of property rights change emerges out of the thought of North,
and Thomas and Davis [Davis and North 1971; North and Thomas 1970]. The state is viewed as
a strategic actor in the development of new property rights, moving to take advantage of new
economic opportunities through changes in the rules of the game. The state is viewed to be
pursuing its own interests, which are centred on revenue maximization. The state is not a black
box in public choice theory, but an active and independent actor in the economy.
These efforts to reconstruct property rights theory in light of new research and changing
realities are exciting. Indeed, the new theories answer the call from scholars demanding a more
political model of property rights change [Bates 1990; Firmin-Sellers 1996]. Yet, there is still a
need for refinement in the theory, particularly regarding the role of the state. In the early
articulation of property rights theory the state, indeed all political variables, were ignored or
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assumed. As the theory developed, the public choice literature considered the state to be a
player, but one with an interest only in revenue maximization. This was a laudable improvement
in the theory, but the role of the state is not always so obvious.
This paper examines property rights development through the empirical analysis of three
areas of Imperial Ethiopia (before the 1974 revolution). In each of the cases it is possible to
identify specific moments of change in the price or value of land relative to the other factors of
production, labour and capital, which the theory tells us should be followed by a change in the land
holding institutions. The discussion of the cases is divided into two parts. The first part will
analyse those areas in which relative price changes led to institutional change as the theory predicts:
Sidamo and Eritrea. The second will be a detailed discussion of an area in which a change in
relative prices did not cause a corresponding change in property rights, Tegulet and Bulga area of
northern Shoa.

Case 1: Sidama area, Sidamo province
The Sidama area is one in which experienced the change from a collective tenure system,
to serfdom and then to tenancy with the development of coffee farming in the southern areas of
Ethiopia. This particular case is interesting in that the impact of agricultural commercialisation is
so pronounced. The property rights and indeed the freedom and livelihood of the Sidama people
were dramatically altered with development of coffee as a major export crop in Ethiopia.
Institutional change in land tenure in Sidamo develops with the intensification of coffee
cultivation. Ethiopian popular lore alleges that the coffee plant originated in the southern Ethiopian
region of Keffa, hence the name coffee. While indigenous to the area, coffee was not exploited as a
cash crop until Menelik became emperor of Ethiopia in the late 1800s. Though Menelik understood
the potential value of coffee to the country, the structures instigated to take advantage of its
potential were not in place until Haile Selassie’s rule as emperor began in 1930.5 Evidence of
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government interest in the development of coffee first occurs during Menelik’s rule with the
establishment of toll points on the periphery of coffee producing areas. Through these toll points, a
tax, levied on all coffee leaving the region, was remitted to the regional administrators and,
eventually, to the central government [McClellan 1986]. By the 1920s, toll points could be found
throughout southern Ethiopia [Marcus 1996:79]. However, at that time most of the revenue gained
from customs taxes went to the coffers of regional lords. It was not until 1925 that Haile Selassie
(then still prince regent Ras Tafari) established a centralized customs authority designed to ensure
the remittance of these revenues to the central government [Zewde 1991:99].
The verdant northern areas of Sidamo province were inhabited by Oromo, Gedeo and
Sidama people, settled agriculturists who cultivated coffee, ensete and vegetables. Onto this
landscape, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, appeared the soldier-farmers from the north, the
neftenya 6 given land grants by Menelik and Haile Selassie. With the influx of these northerners,
primarily but not exclusively Amhara from Shoa Province [McClellan 1986:179], coffee farming
and production began in earnest. The arrival of soldier-farmers was an important step in assuring a
regular stream of coffee exports from the region as they planted coffee and ensured its cultivation
by indigenous peoples. The process continued with the shift of rights and obligations of the local
people from serfdom (tenancy with labour and gift requirements as well as no exit option) to
common tenancy in the 1920s and 1930s. In the early years of the northern settlement, labour was
considered to be as essential as land in the production of coffee and some northerners were
reluctant to take land unless it came with a corresponding labour pool of gebbars or peasants
(McClellan 1988:83). By the 1920s the first wave of neftenya was already present as lords on the
land. However, they were not necessarily wealthy from their acquisitions.

The second wave of

neftenya who came during the 1920s, 1930s and later took on a different role, acting as landlords,
rather than overlords, concerned more with revenue generation than position.7
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Logistical problems involved in growing coffee, transferring it to Addis Ababa and out of
the country through government channels were an incentive for the government to continue its
policy of land grants from the late 19th to the early twentieth century and beyond. Without the
feudal system of rights established by the land grant program, it would have been possible, though
dangerous and potentially very expensive due to the presence of bandits, for coffee growers to
export their coffee through Kenya or Sudan; thereby depriving the Imperial government of the
collection of export taxes that hinged on coffee passing through regulated exit points within
Ethiopia.
Actual export figures for coffee are not available for this period. However, Figure 1
displays the importance of coffee to the export market in the years preceding the revolution. We can
expect that the situation was similar, if not more pronounced, in the earlier Imperial era.

[Figure 1 here]

Property rights theory would suggest that increasing land value would lead to the increased
privatisation or individualisation of land to ‘internalise externalities’. The people of an area
experiencing an increase in land value would want to assure themselves of the profits from the
fruits of the land. They would, therefore, seek to make explicit land rights previously held in a
customary fashion, with flexible boundaries and without title.
The change in relative prices that we seek can be identified in the development of coffee as
a cash crop and the subsequent increase in the value of land. Land changed from being useful for
subsistence to essential for revenue generation. Its value increased in the change, although due to a
dearth of data from that time period we cannot say exactly how much land values increased.
However, we can posit with confidence that before the turn of the century land in Southern Ethiopia
was plentiful and because of its availability, of negligible value. Property rights theory also
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correctly identified the timing of the subsequent change in land rights from collective to tenancy of
the peasants in the area. What the theory does not and perhaps cannot identify was the role of
external actors (here the state) in changing and enforcing an entirely new system of property rights.
Though the change in relative prices that occurred when coffee was developed led to a
change in property rights, the method in which this change was effected was anything but
endogenous and had rather severe distributional repercussions as the indigenous peasantry saw their
land rights become more specified, but also alienated into the hands of the neftenya.

Case 2: Hamasien
Because Hamasien was a part of Eritrea, it is different from the other two case studies in
that there was a colonial government. This government was instrumental in forcing a change in the
property rights system from individually held, hereditary land (risti) to collective land tenure based
on residence in a village (diessa). The Italian reasons for dictating this change in land tenure are
articulated below. The end result was a move away from individualized tenure (and the loss of
security in a particular plot of land) in an attempt to preserve social order and facilitate the
administration of the Eritrean colony.
Italian occupation of the Eritrean territory from 1886 until 1941 gave the Eritrean province
an experience of colonialism not shared by the rest of Imperial Ethiopia. Italian colonization led to
the claim to a separate history that later gave birth to the Eritrean independence movement.
However, during the time under study here, the Eritrean province was under the control of the
Italians and subsequently the Ethiopian state. Italian colonial possession of Eritrea lasted from
1886 until 1941. From 1941 until 1952, Eritrea, along with other former Italian colonies of Libya
and Italian Somaliland, was a protectorate under the immediate control of the British Military
Administration. In 1952, the Four Powers Commission of the United Nations ceded control of the
Eritrean colony to Ethiopia in a federation. Eritrea remained federated under Ethiopian control
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until 1962, at which time the Ethiopian state moved to incorporate Eritrea as the fourteenth
province of Ethiopia.
Before the Italians officially occupied the colony in 1886, the lowland areas of the
province were home to nomadic pastoralists of the Beni-Amer and Afar peoples, while the
highland areas, including Hamasien, were primarily the domain of Tigrayan, Christian
agriculturalists who farmed grain crops on unirrigated land.8 Because rainfall was variable on the
plateau, agricultural yields changed significantly from year to year, leading to a cycle of drought
and famine familiar to the rest of the Horn. There were three tenure systems that existed on the
plateau before the Italians came. The first was risti land,9 similar to the rist land that existed
throughout northern Ethiopia. This was a tenure system in which the land was occupied and farmed
by an individual who maintained the right to transfer the land to his or her children, but the land
was ultimately considered to belong to the lineage group and was not alienable. Land changed
hands in the rist or risti system through inheritance or litigation. The second type of tenure was
diessa, a system that was communal by residence, in which land changed hands every five to seven
years and was distributed among those people living in the village with status as residents of the
community. The last type of tenure was private land that had been acquired through purchase.
Private land was held in small parcels throughout the plateau. Traditionally, communal lands were
taxed by regional lords in a system called gult, which required the payment of tribute in honey
and labour as well as a tithe of the crops.10
The Italian colonial administration envisioned Eritrea to be a settler colony and they
arranged land expropriation with that in mind. Every Italian family that came to Eritrea was
guaranteed between eight and twenty-five hectares of land depending on the quality of the land.
This land was given to them on a twenty-year lease. If the family or person to whom the land
was granted cultivated and paid taxes on the land for the duration of the contract, the land would
be granted to them in perpetuity at the end of the twenty years [Bollettino Ufficiale 1895]. The
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amount of land promised to the settling families and the area needed for other purposes such as
agricultural experiments, state farms and government offices, meant the eventual expropriation of
almost half the arable on the highland plateau [Mesghenna 1989:157]. It was the most valuable
land, that which was naturally irrigated by rivers or regular rainfall, which was first appropriated
[Gebre-Medhin 1989:55].
The net effect of Italian colonial policies was to change the relative price of land for
Eritreans. While land expropriation made land access easy for the Italians, it increased land
scarcity and therefore land value in relation to other factors of production for Eritreans.
Colonization and the change in relative prices that it brought should have eventually led to a
change in the land holding institutions of the Eritrean peasants. Yet, Italian intervention in the
rural land institutions was also proactive. Rather than leave the indigenous tenure institutions to
adapt to changes in relative prices of their own accord, the colonial government chose to legislate
changes in the institutions from above. These imposed alterations to the land holding institutions
occurred in two areas: use rights and the traditional tenure system, diessa.

Use rights
The Italian administration restricted land ownership to Italians alone and gave the
Eritreans usufruct rights to the land that they occupied. In the lowland areas of the country the
government claimed most of the land as demaniale or ‘state’ land. Pastoralists were allowed to
graze herds on these lands in the traditional manner without holding any legal rights. Many of
the pastoralists found this situation unacceptable and, as a result, Italian attempts to gain land in
the lowlands were occasionally met with violence.11 Agriculturalists were also restricted to use
rights rather than ownership rights to land but, because they were left to farm without
intervention, this change in property rights was not entirely apparent until the Italians took more
forceful action in the alteration of the communal systems of land tenure that existed. Direct
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government interference into the land holding institutions on the highland plateau did not take
place for several decades after colonization, largely due to the lack of colonial infrastructure in
the countryside.

Diessa
As Italian immigration to the colony grew, the need for arable land increased. The Italian
immigrant community grew until, by 1941 when the Allied Forces pushed out the colonial
government, the Italian population was up to 70,000. During the 1920s and 1930s there was also a
movement of people from the Tigray province of Ethiopia into Eritrea. With the risti tenure
system it was impossible to incorporate these newcomers into the life of the rural community
because they were not allowed access to land or full membership in the decision-making of the
community [Taddia 1986].12 Additionally, the Italians observed that the risti system led to a
diminution of holdings and litigation over land rights that clogged the judicial and administrative
systems of the colony.13 As a solution to these problems, in the 1930s the Italians declared the
suspension of risti in two of the three highland provinces: Hamasien and Akelle-Guzai. In these
two areas, the most fertile in the colony, all Eritreans had their risti systems changed to diessa,
village tenure. Diessa existed before the arrival of the Italians, but risti was the dominant tenure
institution in Hamasien. In the diessa system, ownership rights were vested in the village and
each village had set residential and field boundaries that the village leadership had power to
allocate.

The change in tenure institutions had two immediate results: the admission of

immigrants into cultivation and the allocation of land held by individuals into common village
lands. As land transferred to the control of villages, village elders became responsible for the
redistribution process that occurred every five years. This effectively removed the transaction
costs resulting from disputes over inheritance and land transfer under the traditional system. Yet,
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at the same time individuals lost the security of the guarantee of a particular plot and certainly
lost the benefits that could be gained from investment in their fields.14
In at least one study of an indigenous community in Tigray, in an area close to the
Eritrean border, Giovanni Ellero noted that communities did sometimes shift between risti and
diessa prior to the juridical change by the Italian administration. Ellero described in Uolcait (or
Wolqait), a mass exodus of people from the region at the time of the fall of Yohannes IV, due to
fighting in the area. When the people returned after a three year absence it was decided that land
previously held as rist would be changed to diessa so as to better accommodate the new arrivals
and determine who would be responsible for the payment of taxes [Ellero 1995:126]. Ellero’s
findings are consistent with other studies of Tigray, the neighbouring region where much later
both John Bruce and Dan Bauer noted the existence of rist and diessa communities side by side
and also indicated that transitions between the two systems were politically difficult to negotiate,
but not unheard of and used as a method of helping communities adapt to population change
[Bauer 1972; Bruce 1976].
In Eritrea, institutional change occurred following changes in the relative value of land.
Yet, the shifts in property rights institutions that developed (and became law) were not
endogenously generated and not in the direction of individualized rights. One area of Eritrea
where the Italians did not alter the tenure system was in Seraye, the last of the three highland
provinces. In Seraye, the risti system continued into the 1990s with no endogenous institutional
change despite significant manifestation of relative price changes.

This indigenous tenure

system was able to remain in place through decades of population growth and several changes in
government. The experience of Seraye suggests that without colonial intervention, the risti
system may have continued in Hamasien and Akelle-Guzai regardless of transaction costs and
diminution of holdings.15
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Sidama and Hamasien
Sidama in Ethiopia and the Hamasien area of Eritrea represent two areas where changes
in land value led to changes in property rights much as property rights theory would suggest.
Sidama and Eritrea are similar in that they both experienced an influx of people and
administrative structures from outside, that affected both the ratio of land to labour and the
development of institutions. For Eritrea, the imposition of administrative structures came about
as a result of colonialism, in a manner similar to the rest of the African continent. Sidama is a
distinctly different and interesting case; the conquest that occurred there came from within
Ethiopia, as the northern soldier-farmers moved into the area and enserfed the peasantry under
government auspices.
One key lesson to be learned from the experiences of Eritrea and Sidama is that
institutional change in response to relative price changes may be instituted from above exogenous to the traditional system of tenure rights and the actors within that system. Both
Sidama and Eritrea, neither of which spontaneously altered land holding or allocation institutions
aptly demonstrate this. Instead, institutional changes in response to changes in the relative price
of land occurred, or were altered by the arrival of a foreign, regional administration. The
imposition of a change in property rights from above, in both cases demonstrates the resistance
of traditional institutional structures to changes in relative prices and the role of government or
administrative bodies in compelling institutional adaptation, for better or for worse.16

Case 3: Tegulet and Bulga, Shoa Province
Most of northern Shoa province, and indeed northern Ethiopia, maintained some form of
rist or risti tenure system prior to the revolution.

This property rights system allowed for

individually held, heritable land, but the land was for the most part inalienable, as it was considered
to be owned by a lineage rather than an individual.17 Tegulet and Bulga maintained this system of
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property rights through a period of agricultural commercialisation and population growth without
changing to a more individualized system allowing for alienable rights and private property.
Changes in the system did occur, but they were alterations in the contractual agreements on land
rental and as such did not constitute changes in the ‘rules of the game’ or how the tenure system
operated.
Tegulet and Bulga diverges from the experiences of the other two areas because no external
intervention of any sort occurred there. Instead, the increase in land values relative to other factors
of production such as labour was a result of the gradual commercialisation of agriculture and
population increase in the province during the mid-twentieth century. The history of commercial
development in the Shoan area has been the subject of several studies, of special interest is the work
that has been completed on the grain market in the Shoan countryside, discussed below.
Before the market economy developed in the Ethiopian countryside, barter was the norm,
with cash in the form of Maria Theresa dollars used sparingly,18 mostly for the purposes of taxation.
During the 1950s Haile Selassie began to develop the banking and marketing institutions of the
country. Mechanisms for the transportation and marketing of grain emerged in the countryside as
demand grew and the infrastructure to support a market was put in place.19 Infrastructural
development made farming more profitable as surplus crops could be sold for supplementary
income. The commercialisation of agriculture increased the value and the demand for land as
farmers sought to take advantage of new market possibilities. At the same time, population in the
countryside was growing, leading to an increase in the relative scarcity of land. Changing demand
for land and increasing land values or land competition Occurred in response to the development of
the grain market and the rising population.
Population growth was occurring at a rapid rate in the Ethiopian countryside throughout the
late 20th century, though it was sometimes difficult to determine this from government statistics.
Prior to 1984, the government Central Statistical Office calculated population figures by using
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random sample surveys at various places throughout the country. These were then used to estimate
the population and growth rates for all areas of the country. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the
government statistics show the population rising at a steady, but moderate 1.02 per cent/yr in urban
and rural areas of the north and the south. This is hardly convincing or revealing. By the time the
first census was taken in 1984, it was clear that these figures had significantly underestimated
population growth rates, which were nearer to 3 per cent/yr. As an example, 1980 population
statistics for Tegulet and Bulga showed a population of 423,000 people. Four years later, when the
census occurred the population statistic jumped to 568, 590 people, over a third higher than that
predicted just a few years earlier [Commission 1989]. A backward estimation of population using
the 1984 census results and demonstrates more than a doubling of the population during the years of
the study. If more conservative population growth rates were used, the results would be equally
persuasive that population growth during this time period was significant and certainly more so than
the government at the time was either able to determine or willing to admit. Even in the absence of
precise or convincing population statistics, there is ample evidence from anecdotal reports that
population was, in fact, increasing throughout northern Ethiopia [Bauer 1972; Ellero 1995].
If we are to search for empirical evidence of an increase in the relative price of land, we
should begin in the 1950s, when the cash economy began to flourish after the war, and look for any
shift in land value or competition for land.

There is anecdotal information available from

anthropological studies conducted in nearby provinces that suggest that increasing populations were
effecting the land tenure institutions there [Bauer 1972]. Though there is no similar information for
Tegulet and Bulga, any change should have occurred in the period for which we have court records.
Because there are no formal records of the price of land in Shoa province, due to the restrictions on
land sale, and because we also know from the study that land sales outside of a family were
infrequent [Weissleder 1965; Work 1962], we are compelled to look back to the court cases from
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Tegulet and Bulga province to determine if there is any detectable increase in land competition,
recorded land sales or other contractual agreements such as seasonal rentals.
In both Ethiopia and Eritrea legal records are kept carefully. Indeed, some records can
be found dating back to the turn of the century and earlier. A survey of court records was
conducted for four years during the thirty-year pre-Revolutionary period. Initially, attempts were
made to collect data from the years 1947, 1957, 1967 and 1974. If this failed because of a lack of
availability, the years closest to those target years were collected. In any given sub-province,
information on all of the cases that were lodged in the specified year was collected, however, this
does not necessarily mean a record of every case was acquired. In many instances, case records
had disappeared.20 Thus the data set that exists is problematic, yet not entirely without use.

Land Sales
While we would expect an increase in land prices and land rental prices in reaction to
increasing land scarcity, we can also expect an increase in the number of contested land sales. If
land becomes more valuable, the temptation for individuals to sell increases, as do similar pressures
on a lineage to keep land within the family and thereby available to future generations through
inheritance. These pressures on land holding and acquisition should become visible in increasing
competition for land and, according to property rights theory, rising competition should be followed
by an institutional change in the land tenure system.
None of the information collected provides a good assessment of the demand for land on its
own. However, there are several ways in which we can attempt to measure land competition. The
first is by examining the number of land sales over time. Weissleder [1965] and Joireman [1996]
both noted that although rist lands were supposedly inalienable in Tegulet and Bulga, land sales
did, in fact, occur. We remind the reader of one caveat before looking at these figures; the data
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collected are not a standard random sample. They are the entire record of civil litigation for three
years (1947, 1967 and 1974) in the three decades before the revolution.21 Often, a portion of the
records was missing or destroyed so caution is needed in comparing incidence of sales across years.
This warning aside, it is still worthwhile to search for trends in the data. When we examined the
data for evidence of changing numbers of land sales over time, there was no detectable trend. The
results were inconclusive because of the lumpiness of the data and the lack of consistent sample
size across time. A second method of assessing trends in the data is to investigate total land cases
over time. By using all cases instead of just land sales we will be able to capture the effect of the
change in land values in whatever manner it is expressed, i.e., an increase in land rentals,
inheritance disputes, sales, or lifetime rental contracts. Given the difficulty that existed in selling
land, we might posit an increase in the amount of long-term land rental (magazo) or seasonal letting
of land (walad agad). These results are displayed in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 here]

The results again are inconclusive. Even when we break the land cases down into all of their
respective categories, we see no significant increase in land conflicts as time progressed. A
breakdown of the cases over years and categories follows in Figure 3.22
[Figure 3 here]
Inheritance, which was often observed to be the principal source of conflict in communal
areas, decreases as a percentage of conflicts over time but usurpation, disputes over the fruits of
the land (the division of the harvest in sharecropping contracts), trespass and rent all increase
slightly. The overall trend is a slight decline in land cases over time, yet land cases remain a
large percentage of cases over all and the largest single category of dispute. The changing
composition of the land cases, could be due to the diversification of contracts which was
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occurring.23 The author has noted elsewhere [Joireman 1996] the proliferation of rental
arrangements prior to the revolution, specifically irbo arash and ekul arash share agreements in
which the harvest was split with one-quarter or one-half of the crop going to the landlord. We
can posit that over time the amount of the crop going to the landlord may have increased, with
more ekul than irbo arash arrangements taking place, but we have no specific evidence to show
that this was the case. What we do know is that as the value of land increased we see new
contractual arrangements developing such as yequm worse, the bequeathing of land before a
person dies. In this arrangement land is given to a person’s heirs and the heirs pay a percentage
of the crop as rent. We would have been able to detect conflict over rental contracts in two
categories, land rental and fruits (short for fruits of the land, whatever they might be). In both
areas we see increases in disputes over time as population pressure increases. The next highest
category of litigation was contractual disputes over issues such as cattle or the division of
property after a divorce.
Land conflict was high at the beginning of the study and high at the end with little change
in the middle. We know from anecdotal reports and population growth that during this period land
values were increasing, yet the land tenure system remained virtually the same. The diversification
of rental contracts and the presence of greater conflict over land rental demonstrates some
endogenous movement toward change at the margins of the land tenure system, but there is no
significant detectable shift towards more securely held or individualized rights.

While these

attempts to detect any changes in the land tenure system prove fruitless, we know that the
percentage of all cases over land in Shoa was much higher than it was in any of the other regions of
the study, as Figure 4 displays below.

[Figure 4 here]
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We have, then, a region of the country demonstrating a significant and consistent dispute
over land rights, and increasing value of land constituting a change in relative prices with the only
change in the land tenure being some diversification in rental contracts. This is a compelling set of
observances. The demand for land transfer must have also increased. Sara Berry’s research on land
transfer in Kenya indicated that when the price of land increased in Kenya, people sold land in
order to migrate to different areas, to pay school fees for children (future investment), to meet
family expenses i.e. medical or bridewealth, to pay debts or to cover the costs of litigation [Berry
1992:127]. These needs were present in the Ethiopian context as well, but no legal market for
land transfer developed. Moreover, there are other contexts in Ethiopia in which an increasing
population led to a change in the local tenure system [Bauer 1972; Ellero 1995].
It is apparent that the impetus for changing land rights was present in North Shoa; we
must now begin to evaluate intervening variables that may have prevented the change in tenure
institutions from taking place. There are two intervening variables on which we will focus: the
government and the rural nobility, an interest group noted for its influence.

The government
The question we seek to answer in this section is; did the government have any
motivation to keep the system of property rights in the northern areas of the country in place?
The simple answer to the question is no. The government had several opportunities to intervene
in the traditional institutions of the north because of peasant uprisings and the gradual
codification of laws which was taking place [David 1957; Mandefro].24 Yet, the government did
not choose to alter the traditional institutions in any way. Moreover, the northern parts of the
country where coffee was not produced escaped government attention in all but the most extreme
circumstances.25 The concern of the Ethiopian central administration was not to maintain control
over the more remote northern areas of the country, or to bleed the peasants with taxation, but
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rather to allow political allies both to administer and expropriate without intervention in a type of
indirect rule. Thus, the government had no interest in the affairs of the northern countryside
apart from the interests of the northern elites whose compliance with the imperial regime Haile
Selassie desperately needed. The northern elites were an important interest group during the
imperial era both because of their role in administration and their support for Haile Selassie
during the turbulent post-war era. Because of their power in the countryside, this rural nobility
provided the most likely government in waiting, or potential pool of successors to the emperor.
It is to this group that we must next turn.

Regional Elites
Did the regional elites, or rural nobility, have any interest in sustaining the status quo in
the northern areas of the country? In discussing the intentions and effects of the regional elites
on land tenure institutions in the north we must consider only those elites resident and holding
interest in the northern, communal land tenure areas. Northerners who moved south to become
landlords and coffee farmers are outside our immediate concern. Of the resident, northern elites
we know several important facts. First, we know that they were constrained by the same land
tenure system as the rest of the people in the area, the rist system. Second, we know that like
other landholders in the area, they often engaged in litigation to gain access to land. However,
members of the elite were more likely than other peasants to be a plaintiff26 and, whether a
member of the elite was a plaintiff or a defendant, he or she was more likely to win a land case
than were peasants without status. While this last finding, is not tremendously surprising or
counter-intuitive, it has important implications for the understanding of property rights of the
region.
By the mid-1960s the average peasant would have been faced with increasing land
values, an escalating population and restricted access to land through the traditional rist system.
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To try to take advantage of market opportunities within the constraints of the traditional tenure
institution we can imagine that peasants would have been engaged in more land rental as other
land access was restricted. The court cases prove this conjecture true. We do see a rise in the
percentage of cases over land rent [Joireman 1996]. Evidence on land rentals and contracts
reveals that peasants were seeking to take advantage of changing market opportunities at the
margins, through changing rental and share contracts. Peasants were restricted from embarking
on more radical changes, such as the public buying and selling of land, by their traditional
institutions which were not changing in the face of changing economic circumstances.
Among the elites, there was a very different story. A member of the rural nobility faced
with the same set of economic opportunities had a different set of constraints and opportunities.
Elites in search of more land might begin to take their neighbours to court for peripheral lands
bordering on their farming areas and they usually won. The Appendix to this paper gives a
quantitative analysis of court decisions in Tegulet and Bulga during the years preceding the
revolution using probit regression analysis to determine the impact of both title and ethnicity on
court decisions.

The analysis indicates the importance of status, rather than ethnicity, in

influencing court decisions in Tegulet and Bulga.
As stated earlier, it is impossible to determine to what degree land cases were increasing
over time, but we can tell that elites were using the courts to gain land more often as time went
on. Figure 5 demonstrates the incidence of titled plaintiffs over time.

[Figure 5 here]

The chart shows a sharp increase in the percentage of cases in which elites were plaintiffs and in
which the nature of the dispute regarded land. Litigation over land may have been inheritance
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cases, as the tenure system allowed relatives to claim land from descendants sometimes six
generations back [Hoben 1973], or, cases regarding land usurpation or land trespass. Figure 6
demonstrates that as the relative price of land increased, elites chose to pursue litigation over
land more frequently.27 Because elites were more likely to win litigation once it began, [See
Appendix] and because this fact was evident within the community in which they resided, it is
probable that many of the instances in which elites impinged on land rights did not make it to the
courts.
Elites in Tegulet and Bulga and throughout the communal tenure areas did not face the
same constraints in acquiring land as did the peasants. In addition, extensive rights to land for
the rural nobility were supported by the rist system of land tenure that assured the theoretical
'right' of a land claim back several generations thereby giving almost anyone in a community a
theoretical claim to most of the land in that community. Traditional claims could be exploited by
the elites, who could be said to be holding whatever land they had by traditional right. Why did
the elites not move to change the system to one of private property? It was in their interest to do
so as it would have made permanent their gains.

However, there are two problems that exist

with this very Western idea that a traditional elite group in a developing country would decide to
change from a centuries old system of land holding to privatised property rights. The first is the
inherent psychological contradiction that is involved. This elite group formed their identity based
on their association with the past and their historic prestige in Ethiopia. Changing the system of
land rights would mean compromising that identity. Moreover, altering the system of property
rights would require collective action on the part of the elites, which would be difficult to
achieve in this particular case because not all elites would have fully realized their rist rights
when any change occurred. If the traditional system were to end or to transform itself somehow,
the elites would lose their claim to much of their traditional lands by losing their rist ‘rights’.
Thus an individual only has an incentive to lobby for change when he or she is at the peak of his
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or her power and cannot hope to acquire more land. Since everyone is unlikely to arrive at this
point at the same time, collective action toward change would be hard to achieve.
Tegulet and Bulga demonstrated little change in property rights in response to a change
in relative prices. Fortunately, the change in relative prices in the province occurred during a
period for which we have access to records of litigation. These records allow us a glimpse of
what was happening in the land holding system; a sight that would otherwise be impaired by the
lack of a land market and adequate production records for this time. Within the time of the
study, we do see slight changes in the land tenure institution. However, the changes, rather than
being changes in the rules of the game - institutional changes - are alterations in the contractual
agreements which occur at the margins of the institutional system and an increase in instances of
non-cooperation and the resulting penalties, e.g. litigation costs.
It is our contention that the regional elites received preferential access to land under the
traditional system. The interests of the regional elites presented a deterrent to any government
moves towards changing property rights from above. It also impeded the development of any
changes in property rights from within the society, as those most able to enact these changes
were beneficiaries of the status quo..

Conclusion
It is not entirely surprising that we find a break in the relative price change -institutional
change relationship. The stability of institutional structures, once in place, has been noted in
previous literature [Arthur 1989; David 1985; Rosenthal 1992].

Yet, there are two new

observations herein. First, rather than being delayed, in some circumstances institutional change
did not occur at all in response to changes in relative prices. In Tegulet and Bulga sub-province,
there was no change in property rights before the revolution. It is obvious throughout the years
of the study that pressures existed on the land tenure system, pushing it towards greater
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privatisation or specification of rights. It is equally apparent that the tenure system as it existed
served the interests of the regional nobility and, as a result, no change in institutions occurred.
Because we only observe these institutions until 1974 when the Ethiopia revolution
brought a change in the land holding system throughout the country, we can only conclude that in
the short-term we do not witness a change in property rights in response to a change in relative
prices. This does not necessarily mean that the theory does not hold in the very long-term i.e. 75100 years. We may be witnessing a short-term bargaining over institutions that leads to semipermanent systems of property rights that 1) are held in place by political rather than economic
forces and 2) have important (negative) distributional consequences for indigenous groups.
The second important conclusion to this study is that where institutional change did
occur in response to relative price changes, it was not necessarily an endogenous, adaptive
change. Endogenous changes are predicted by the property rights theory and by current theories
of induced institutional change.

In Sidama we did not see the peasants from the area

incrementally moving towards specification of land rights over time or towards more
individualized rights. Instead, institutional change came as an exogenous shock. In this case,
another actor - the state- observed the change in relative prices and moved in to take advantage of
it, leaving the indigenous population in a position worse than that in which it began. In Eritrea,
we see the same effect. Relative prices changes occurred because of outside intervention and
institutional modifications in land tenure were imposed from above, pushing the people into an
institutional construct fraught with insecurity of land holding. In the Eritrean case institutional
change was both exogenous and progressing in the wrong direction along the evolutionary line of
property rights change.
What are different in these instances are the responses to relative price changes that were
pursued by the same government in Sidamo and in Shoa (and left in place in Eritrea when the
Imperial Ethiopian government took over there in 1952). Because we can identify separate
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policy measures in different areas of the country we can ascertain beyond doubt that the reason
behind state intervention was the assurance of state interests and those of its most important
supporters, rather than simply revenue generation. Thus we have painted a scene in which
political survival, rather than revenue generation – the claim of the public choice school – was
the key determinant in at least one instance of property rights change that did not occur when
predicted.
Finally, this article clearly indicates the need for further micro level field research to
determine precisely how economic and political factors interact in generating or impeding
property rights change in developing countries.

This study had both the benefits and

disadvantages of being historical, but the issue of how property rights changes are generated is
without a doubt a contemporary issue in much of the developing world.

29

Appendix
A probit regression technique is used to examine the effect of particular plaintiff
characteristics on the decision of the case. Probit was chosen over other forms of regression
analysis because the dependent variable, the decision of the judge, was dichotomous and could be
coded as one, for the plaintiff, or zero, for the defendant. Due to the fact that so many of the
cases in the sample had no decision at all, because of factors such as the nationalization of land
which threw all land cases out of court, the failure of the plaintiff or the defendant to appear or
the existence of an out of court settlement, only 581 cases (approximately half the sample) are
used for the probit analysis.
The object in running the probit regression was not to estimate the best model of all the
factors affecting the decision of judges. Instead, it is an attempt to test the effect of different
characteristics of the plaintiff and defendant on the outcome of the case. Plaintiffs and
defendants in Tegulet and Bulga were identified as Amhara/ non-Amhara (1/0) in the ethnicity
variable and titled/untitled (1/0) in the status variable. These are the two factors identified by
informants as important in court decisions. Titled individuals in northern Ethiopia appended their
titles to their names that made them easy to identify in the court cases. Ethnicity also was
determined by name (through consultation with many informants as to origins) those cases
involving individuals with undetermined or confusing ethnic origins were thrown out of the
sample.
Coefficients in a multivariate probit cannot be interpreted in the same way as linear
regression coefficients because of their categorical qualities. To make the results clear, the effect
on the decision of a change in the variable from its zero value to its one value is presented,
holding the other variable at its experimental mean. The important column is the last one that
indicates the decision outcomes of the coincidence of various characteristics.
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One further note before presenting the results is that the dependent variable of the
decision of the court is recorded as zero or one. Therefore in reading the results y* ≥ .5 is
interpreted as P(y = 1), and y*< .5 is interpreted as P(y = 0).

The model is a straightforward

regression model, y* = α + β plaintiff ethnic group + β plaintiff titled +β defendant ethnic
group + β defendant titled. The count r2 is simply a measure of the reliability of the probit model
in predicting outcomes as suggested by Maddala [1989:279].
[Figure 6 here]
[Figure 7 here]
[Figure 8 here]
Correlation coefficients support this evidence.

[Figure 9 here]

Contrary to previous assessments of the area [Brietzke 1982; informant interview research notes
1994], it appears that the elite status of the plaintiff had a greater effect on the outcome of the
case than did ethnicity. Ethnicity alone was no guarantee of success in court.
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Figure 3
Land cases over Time In Tegulet and Bulga
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Figure 4
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* The number of cases for each year in Sidama and Hamasien is approximately 100.
* Land cases for 1967 in Hamasien are particularly high due to action in the courts by the
Government Treasury Office to recuperate back rent for government lands in the province. The
Treasury Office launched fourteen cases which were recorded in this sample and distort the 1967
figure.
* There are no cases in 1957 for Tegulet and Bulga because these records were not available.
According to court officials they were burned by EPDRF soldiers who came through the area in
1991.
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Figure 5
Elite Litigation Across Time
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Figure 8

Combined Areas Probit Results
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Figure 9

Nonparametric Correlations Tegulet and Bulga
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